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1 Introduction
After the first phase of the eastern enlargement in May 2004 the European Union went
through tough negotiations on the financial perspectives for 2007-2013. The perspectives,
that were accepted in December 2005, define general frames and principles of the collection
of revenues for the coming seven years.1 The next interesting question is how these
revenues will be reallocated back to the member states of the enlarged EU including
Bulgaria and Romania that will joint the EU in 2007 or 2008.
Most of the previous studies on the allocation of EU budget spending have focused on
estimating the costs of the eastern enlargement. Courchene et al. (1993) derive estimates
for the structural funds receipts of the candidate countries by using a simple extrapolation
of the budget receipts of the poorest incumbent countries. Other studies, like Brenton and
Gros (1993), Anderson and Tyers (1995), Jackson and Swinnen (1994), and Tangermann
(1996), make specific predictions for the costs of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
due to the eastern enlargement. All of these studies assume that the budget shares derive
from the recipients’ needs and contributors’ solidarity.
Recent research has, however, demonstrated that a completely diﬀerent approach man-
ages to explain member states’ past receipts from the EU budget. This public choice
approach argues that EU budget allocations attribute to the distribution of voting power
in the Council of Ministers, the key decision maker of EU spending. In this power poli-
tics view, member states’ needs deriving from low income regions and poor agricultural
conditions obtain only a minor role, if any.
Baldwin et al. (1997) made, to our knowledge, the first attempt to use the political
power view to explain EU budget allocations empirically. Using observations for 1993
1The EU budget is financed collecting revenues from four resources. The traditional resources are
the tariﬀ revenues and agricultural levies, both collected at the Union’s external border. They are
transferred directly to the common resources except a share that goes for the local administrative costs
of the collection. While the traditional resources had a relatively important role initially, nowadays their
proportion is only one tenth of the total revenues. The third resource is based on Member States’ value
added tax (VAT) base and is like a EU-wide consumption tax, currently one percent rate. The relative
importance of this resource is also declining. The fourth resource is collected from the member states
based on their GNPs. That is, each member state pays a certain percentage (common to all countries)
of its GNP to the common resources. Currently, this resource constitutes about 45 percent of the EU
budget and the share continues to increase.
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and 1994, they regressed per capita receipts on a constant, per capita voting power, and
a dummy variable for poor member countries. They used the Shapley-Shubik index (SSI)
and the actual vote shares to proxy member states’ voting power. Subsequently, Baldwin
et al. (2000, 2001) carried out similar regressions for the periods 1992-94 and 1995-99,
separately. In the latter papers also the normalized Banzhaf index (NBI) of cooperative
games were used as a measure of voting power.2 Based on OLS regression analyses these
studies concluded that per capita budget shares can be explained pretty well by measures
of political power, while variables like the agriculture share of GDP and GDP per capita
fail to be statistically significant.
Also Kandogan (2000) studied the correlation between actual budget shares and SSI.
He developed a tailored game theoretic model for EU’s budget decision-making and ap-
plied it to assess the costs of the eastern enlargement. His empirical analysis were con-
ducted for years 1976-85 and were concerned with both the CAP and the structural
expenditures. He regressed the ratio of the budget shares in CAP expenditures to the
voting power for each country against a constant, deviation of that country’s adjusted
percent of population in agriculture from the EU-average and the logarithm of the voting
power (SSI). He argued that this regression can explain why some countries are receiving
more agricultural funds than implied by their voting power alone. He run a similar re-
gression for the structural funds and obtained the same conclusion as on the CAP shares.
In a way Kandogan’s (2000) analyses indicate that the budget shares cannot be explained
by power politics alone. Nevertheless, it is diﬃcult to see from his analysis what part of
the budget shares can be explained by power politics and what determines the rest of the
shares. Also, a major part of the variation in the budget shares remains unexplained in
these regressions.
Kauppi and Widgrén (2004) make the first attempt to explore the relative importance
of the two hypotheses. For this purpose, Kauppi and Widgrén propose simple relative
measures for the needs of the member states and then combine these with the SSI to
estimate weights for the two views of the EU budget allocation. In their baseline model,
2For the SSI, see Section 2 below, and Shapley (1953) and Shapley and Shubik (1954). For the NBI,
see Penrose (1946) and Banzhaf (1965).
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political power explains about 60% of the member states’ budget receipts and the re-
maining 40% derive from member states’ needs.3 This result is obtained using annual
observations for 1976-2001, a larger data set than in any previous empirical paper on EU
budget. The novel feature of the study is to examine whether the power politics explana-
tion can be improved by taking possible cooperation patterns between EU countries into
account. Kauppi and Widgrén find that even 95% of the budget shares can be explained
by voting power measures that allow for correlated preferences and cooperative voting pat-
terns between the member states. Interestingly, the paper identifies stable cooperation
patterns between France and Germany. Altogether, Kauppi and Widgrén conclude that
selfish power politics is likely to drive EU’s decision making in general and the allocation
of EU budget in particular, while needs play at most a little role.
In this paper, we assume that voting power is what counts in EU budget decision mak-
ing and accordingly apply relevant power measures to project budgetary consequences of
the eastern enlargement under two diﬀerent voting schemes: the Nice and the Constitu-
tional Treaty voting rules, the former being the current state, while the latter being a
possible future state depending on an ongoing political decision process. As we do not
have historical data (budget shares) for the enlarged EU, we cannot examine the impor-
tance of particular cooperative voting patterns for the power distribution of the EU-27.
Therefore, our budget projections rely on a standard voting power measure that does not
take any cooperative voting patterns among member countries into account. Even if this
measure may miss some important cooperative patterns among the current EU member
states we think it is likely to provide the most accurate budget share projections among
alternative prediction approaches. To support this conclusion we revisit some (of our)
earlier empirical analyses on the determinants of past EU budget shares.
Our voting power based budget share predictions yield the following findings. In-
dependently of the voting rules examined, we find that eastern enlargement has large
eﬀects on the budget receipts of the incumbent member states. Diﬀerent voting rules
3The predictive power of the pure SSI improves to 70 percent if the UK rebate is taken into account.
A modified version of the SSI that draws on Straﬃn (1977, 1988) improves the predictive power of pure
power based explanation to 90 percent (see Kauppi and Widgrén 2004 for details).
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make significant diﬀerence for most countries’ positions in the allocation. Most notably,
Germany would gain remarkably from the voting rules of the Constitutional Treaty. The
key explanation is that population counts more under the Constitutional Treaty - with
its large population Germany would be pivotal in most voting situations in the future.
According to our estimates the Constitutional Treaty would make Germany the biggest
recipient of the EU budget. Currently, France is holding this position. Whether this
issue explains why Frenchmen were reluctant to accept the Constitutional Treaty is an
interesting question.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical and
empirical background behind our voting power measure. Section 3 gives background for
the two voting rule proposals we consider, while our projections are given in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Voting Power and Past EU Budget Allocations
The starting point of our analysis is that EU budget shares are determined by the dis-
tribution of political power among member states, and not by their needs. The following
section reviews the relevant theoretical arguments, while the subsequent section shows
how the theory matches with the past EU budget allocations.
2.1 Theory
We assume that the member states use their influence in the Council of Ministers to allo-
cate as much money to their home country as possible.4 Under this hypothesis member
states’ budget shares should reflect their voting power in the Council rather than their
needs for CAP or structural support. In the formal analysis the budget allocation prob-
lem is treated as the dividing-up-the-cake problem. This is one of the most investigated
problems in game and bargaining theory. The literature is very wide ranging from coop-
4For recent applications evaluating the distribution of voting power in the Council of Ministers, see
e.g. Widgrén (1994), Laruelle and Widgrén (1998), Felsenthal and Machover (2001, 2003), Leech (2002),
Baldwin and Widgrén (2004a, 2004b, 2005).
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erative to non-cooperative game theory with several applications. In recent years, these
methods have been applied to study diﬀerent aspects of EU decision-making as well. Here
we adopt the cooperative approach.
A commonly used measure for actors’ voting power is the Shapley-Shubik index (SSI)
(Shapley and Shubik 1954). It can be seen as a special case of a broader concept the
Shapley value (Shapley 1953) in cooperative coalitional form games. SSI is restricted to so-
called simple games that are usually used to model voting games. In simple voting games,
winning and losing coalitions have diﬀerent worth (usually one and zero respectively). The
SSI is based on the broad idea that an actor that can break a winning coalition into losing,
or vice versa, exerts power. These actors are critical in the sense that they may help a
coalition to achieve its goals. Suppose that this help is rewarded by a price, which ends
up as money in the data. Despite of their abstractness there is some recent evidence that
power indices are able to capture actors’ power and that they can be used to predict
decision outcomes in a meaningful way (e.g. Pajala and Widgrén 2004, Thompson et al.
2006).
More formally, let N be a set of n member states in the Council and let S ⊂ N denote
any coalition of member states having s members. A voting game in the Council can
be characterized by a set function v(S) taking on value 1 when a coalition S forms a
qualified majority and zero otherwise. In this simple setting, the Shapley-Shubik index
φi of a member state i can be written
φi =
X
SjN,i∈S
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n! [v(S)− v(S r i)], (1)
where i = 1, ..., n. The first term in the sum gives the probability of country i being in
a pivotal position in coalition S and the latter term counts those pivotal positions where
country i is able to swing a winning coalition into losing, i.e. S is winning and the removal
of i from it makes it losing.5 The individual actors’ SSI values φi sum up to unity.6 Thus,
5One characterization of the SSI refers to actors’ permutations that are equally likely. This is not,
however, a generic property of the index.
6The SSI obeys four axioms. The dummy axiom states that a player without any contribution (swings)
to any coalition is powerless. The eﬃciency axiom states that the cake is fully allocated and there is no
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SSI implies that the relative shares of the players’ swing positions predict their shares of
the total pay-oﬀ. In our application the total pay-oﬀ constitutes the EU’s total budget
spending.7
2.2 Evidence
On the basis of the theory outlined above the actual budget shares of the member states
should be equal to their corresponding voting power shares measured by SSI. However,
looking at past EU budget shares reveals that the SSI values and the realized budget
shares do not match one-to-one (see Kauppi and Widgrén (2004, p. 239)). Does this then
indicate that the theory fails to work in practise? We think this is not necessarily the case.
Even if the decisions (obtained through actual voting) of the Council of Ministers would
be perfectly in line with the member states’ voting power distribution, their practical
implementation is subject to numerous details that are likely to result in deviations from
the intended budget allocation, at least in the short run. Thus, it is reasonable to assume
that the theoretical predictions are accurate only on average. To assess whether such a
long-run notion of the theory works we conduct a statistical analysis.
The simplest possible test of the theory can be based on a single regression
Sit = β0 + β1SSIit + uit, (2)
where Sit denotes country i’s budget share in period t and SSIit denotes the Shapley
Shubik index of voting power for that country. Here the term uit is a stochastic error that
should capture all the short run variation of the budget shares that cannot be explained
by the power measure. We will come back to this in more detail below. To this end,
notice that should the voting power distribution explain the budget shares all alone, we
should have the restrictions β0 = 0 and β1 = 1; and, of course, then the error term should
surplus left. The symmetry axiom states that the names of the players do not aﬀect the allocation but
only their voting rights and, finally the transfer axiom gives the way to combine games. Another classical
power index, the Banzhaf index, obeys all these except the eﬃciency axiom (see Dubey and Shapley 1979
and for an alternative characterization Laruelle and Valenciano 2001).
7Here it is important to see that the EU budget (the cake) can be taken as fixed when decisions on its
allocation are made in the Council. For a careful explanation see Kauppi and Widgrén (2004, p. 230).
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have conditional mean zero.
To examine whether these theoretical conditions get any empirical support, we esti-
mate the regression (2) using a budget share variable obtained from the member states’
budget receipts of which we have annual data from 1976 to 2001. This time span cov-
ers four sub-periods determined by the actual composition of the EU countries: Period
1 (EU-9): 1976-80, Period 2 (EU-10): 1981-85, Period 3 (EU-12): 1986-94, and Period
4 (EU-15): 1995-2001. Notice that the power distribution remains constant over a given
sub-period, and thus changes only four times during the sample period. To remove part
of the short run variation in the dependent variable we employ sub-period observations
computed as the averages of the annual observations of the years of the above four periods
(cf. Kauppi and Widgrén (2004)).
Pooled OLS estimates of the parameters of (2) are reported in Table 1 (column 1).
Notice that the estimate of the constant term does not deviate significantly from zero,
while the parameter estimate of the SSI variable is clearly significant. The 95% confidence
interval of the SSI parameter is [.985, 1.25]. This interval includes 1.0, and thus, is in line
with our theoretical expectations. Furthermore, an F -test for the joint hypothesis of
β0 = 0 and β1 = 1 has a p-value 0.21. Thus, these simple statistics imply that the data
is consistent with our theoretical predictions. It is rather astonishing that in this single
regression the SSI variable is able to explain 87 percent of the variance in budget shares.
At this point it is reasonable to discuss the validity of the above statistical analysis.
Basically, we wish that the above regression results reflect a true causal relationship:
voting power measured by SSI essentially determines the EU budget shares in the long
run. For this interpretation to be valid, the SSI measure should be exogenous. That is,
any other factors (anything in the error term uit) aﬀecting the budget shares should be
independent of the SSI measure. There is no obvious reason why this might not be the
case. First of all, notice that the SSI measure derives from abstract game theoretical
considerations that are by no means related to the EU decision making or to the ways
the Council’s decisions are implemented in practise. Nevertheless, it is useful to discuss
in more detail what the error term may contain.
There are natural reasons why the error in (2) may be nonzero. As we noted above, the
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actual decisions of the Council cannot determine precisely how much money is allocated
to each country. As a result, the budget shares do not necessarily match with the power
shares even if they should. Also, it probably takes relatively long time to correct past
deviations from the intended budget shares, while new errors may still enter the process.
Another issue is that the member states do not necessarily immediately see how much
power their votes really give to them. It may well take a few years for a new member state
to learn to take the full advantage of its voting power. For example, during their first
seven years Austria, Finland and Sweden received clearly less from the EU budget than
their power shares predict. It is interesting to see whether they have now learned their
voting power so that their budget shares catch up with their SSI values in the enlarged
EU. Nevertheless, we cannot see a reason why any of these factors should correlate with
the SSI values.
Another type of challenge to the validity of the above regression derives from the view
that the EU budget is in fact allocated on the basis of member states’ needs rather their
power. Namely, the EU declares that its spending aims at promoting equal economic
and social progress across the member states. Oﬃcial publications say, for example, that
“by their nature, structural actions should result in diﬀerences in expenditure between
member states”. We believe these types of statements do not match with the reality
concerning the decisions of the Council. Why would a minister, a representative of his
or her country, care something else but the interests of his or her own country? Still,
somebody may be willing to believe or argue that the EU decision making follows, as
it declares, high minded principles and solidarity. Thus, one could claim that the above
result are due to the fact that the power measure just happens to correlate with the actual
needs of the member states. There is no obvious reason why the voting power measures
should correlate with the actual needs of the member states. Why would the power shares
match with the shares based on the true needs of these countries? If the power measure
does not need to match one-to-one with the needs share, why the evidence still supports
such one-to-one relationship?
Although many arguments support the assumption that the SSI measure is exogenous,
the above regression is still subject to some technical caveats. The key problem is the
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fact that the values of the dependent variable sum to unity for a given time period. Thus,
observations within a sub-period cannot be purely independent. Also, it follows that the
errors are non-normal and most likely heteroskedastic.8 The underlying problems are
discussed to some extent in the recent literature on the statistical analysis of fractional
response variables (see, e.g., Kieschnik andMcCullough, 2003, and Papke andWooldridge,
1996). The general message from these studies is that these problems should be handled
by formulating a linear model for the logistic transformation of the dependent variable
or by applying a non-linear regression. Unfortunately none of the existing models applies
directly to our set up here. Nevertheless, under the null hypothesis that the voting power
is essentially what matters in the long-run, the linear specification seems to be the most
natural choice, despite the fact that the short-run factors in the error term may involve
nonlinearities.
The above approach for modeling past budget shares as a function of the SSI measure
can be challenged by one more point. The critical question is whether the SSI measure
gives accurate enough description of the actual power distribution of the member states.
The SSI assumes that the voters’ preferences (probabilities of voting yes) are correlated
in the same way regardless of the group of actors. However, in reality some countries may
have more similar interests than others in many issues and thus may find it optimal to
cooperate on a wide range of issues more closely. If such cooperative groupings of EU
member states are important in the real world, the standard SSI may yield an imprecise
measure of the true power distribution of the member states. In our previous paper Kauppi
and Widgrén (2004), we considered modified SSI values under the assumption that the
EU is divided into two opposite groups of member states. We computed corresponding
modified SSI measures for all possible bi-partitions of the EU countries. Interestingly
we found that such modified power measures provide significantly better match with the
past EU budget shares than the pure SSI provided that France and Germany are on the
same side. On the basis of this result it is likely that the pure SSI does not give a perfect
8To check whether potential heteroscedasticity of the errors might make any diﬀerence to our results,
we repeated the above t- and F -tests using White’s heteroscasticity consistent standard errors. This did
not lead to any significant diﬀerence to the previous results, even if the validity of these robust standard
errors entails large samples.
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measure of the true power distribution of the EU member states.
To see whether the Franco-German partnership suggested by Kauppi and Widgrén
(2004) might explain why our initial regression estimates deviate slightly from the theo-
retical expectations we augmented our regression with a ”Franco-German dummy” that
equals one for the observations on France and Germany and is zero otherwise. The es-
timation results are presented in column (2) of Table 1. Clearly, the Franco-German
dummy is significantly diﬀerent from zero. With its positive parameter estimate it seems
to capture at least a part of the extra gains France and Germany may have obtained
through their shared interests in the EU decision making. Notice also that the estimate
of the coeﬃcient of the power measure is approximately equal to one.
It would be interesting to examine more carefully what cooperative patterns may be
important in the current EU. Unfortunately, we have to wait for a couple of years to
obtain suitable data for such an analysis of the enlarged EU. For the time being, we thus
compute budget share predictions on the basis of the standard SSI values. Even if this
approach may neglect some important cooperative patterns among the current member
states, the above evidence on the EU-15 data indicates that this measure can still be
rather accurate first approximation for the power distribution and hence for the budget
allocation.
3 Considered Voting Rules
The voting rules of the Council of Ministers have always been a big issue for the expanding
EU, even if they have been practically constant from the Treaty of Rome in 1957 until
the Treaty of Nice in 2001.9 A concern has been that the EU’s decision making becomes
increasingly diﬃcult or even paralyzed when the number of its member states increases.
The worst conflicts have, however, been around the distribution of voting power. Es-
pecially large member countries have been concerned that old rules are too favorable to
small countries. The importance of this problem raised considerably in the case of eastern
9In 1973, the Treaty of Rome votes were multiplied by 2.5 except by 2 for Luxembourg. Table 2 gives
the numbers of votes for EU-15 using the 1973 weighting that remained until the Treaty of Nice.
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enlargement, which brought in a number of new small countries. Therefore, these issues
have now resulted in a true change of voting rules.
The ongoing revision of the Council voting rules started already in the 1996 inter-
governmental conference (IGC-1996). Voting rule reform was then stated as a pre-
condition for the eastern enlargement. The following summit in Amsterdam in June
1997 failed to find an agreement on re-weighting of the votes, thus this question was fur-
ther postponed to IGC-2000. Based on several proposals made during the conference by
the Commission and diﬀerent national delegates10 the marathon Summit of Nice finally
reached an agreement in December 2000. The agreement was a re-weighting scheme that
reallocated votes from the smallest to the biggest nations.11
The voting rules set in the Nice Treaty maintained the qualified majority voting frame-
work, but added two extra criteria concerning the number of countries that support a
proposal and the share of EU population they represent. Specifically, the vote threshold
was set in Nice to 74 percent (255 of 345 votes).12 Moreover, a simple majority of member
states (14 members in EU-27) and countries representing 62 percent of the EU popula-
tion were required for the acceptance of a proposal. The distribution of the Council votes
under the Treaty of Nice are shown in Table 2.
The Constitutional Treaty that was politically agreed in June 2004 resulted in a switch
from a weighted voting into a dual majority voting system with additional requirements.
First, a winning coalition must represent at least 55 percent of the EU members and,
second, 65 percent of the EU population. Moreover, during the final negotiations two last-
minute Summit compromises were inserted: first, at least 15 member states are required
10See Baldwin et al. (2000) for a through evaluation of diﬀerent alternatives.
11The Nice rules came into force in November 1, 2004. The first months after the eastern enlargement
were governed under the old rules. In EU jargon, these rules were called Temporary Accession Treaty
voting rules. Their contents are qualified majority voting with weighted votes and the old majority
threshold of 71 percent to win (88 of 122 votes). The numbers of votes for the incumbent 15 are
unchanged; those for the ten new Member States are a simple interpolation of EU15 votes as specified
in the Accession Treaty. We also computed the estimates under the temporary rules. They are not,
however, reported here. These results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
12The Treaty of Nice defines the voting rules for EU27. The Draft Council Decision relating to the
implementation of Article I-24 in the Accession Treaties of the ten new member states made a temporary
change by reducing the quota to 72.2 percent of the Council votes. When Bulgaria and Romania enter
in 2007 or 2008 the original Nice rules will come into force.
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to pass a proposal and second, no proposal can be blocked by less than four countries.
Both of these additional rules have a negligible impact on EU-27 decisions. In EU-27, 15
members constitute 55.6 percent of membership meaning that the membership criterion
(55 percent) is not binding. After the entry of Turkey and Croatia ’15 member states’
criterion would not, on the contrary, be binding any longer. Voting rules specified by
the Constitutional Treaty are supposed to become into force in November 1, 2009. The
rejection of the Constitution by the French and Dutch referenda put, however, the whole
constitution in jeopardy and has, at least, made the timetable, if not the ratification,
highly uncertain.
In the following, we focus on the Nice and the Constitutional Treaty voting rules, since
they are the relevant alternatives in the foreseeable future. As long as the Constitutional
Treaty or any other alternative reform fails to pass, the Treaty of Nice rules form the fall-
back solution. Our analysis below attempts to assess the budget allocation consequences
of the eastern enlargement under the two alternative states of the future EU.
4 Budget Allocation Predictions
In this section, we present budget allocation estimates for the EU by applying the SSI
power measure under the two voting rule schemes discussed in the previous section. We
present separate estimates for EU-15 and EU-27. Our EU-15 estimates are predictions
for the receipts of the incumbent member states prior to the enlargement using the pre-
enlargement voting rules, while the EU-27 estimates are for all the twenty-seven member
states after the 2004 enlargement and the entry of Bulgaria and Romania. The latter ones
include estimates both under the voting rules of the Nice Treaty (NT) and under those
of the Constitutional Treaty (CT). Table 3 reports the respective budget share estimates
and Table 4 translates them into actual receipts in 2003 euros.
The results in Table 3 demonstrate that voting rules have large impacts on most
member states’ budget share predictions. In particular, the budget share estimates of EU-
27 under CT deviate rather much from those obtained under NT. In particular, Germany
does much better under CT than under NT. CT is also favorable to the other big countries
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France, Italy and the UK, while the rest of the incumbent countries clearly loose under
the CT rules. Most notably, Germany also gains if we compare its budget share in EU-15
under the pre-enlargement rules to the CT rules in EU-27.13 Among the new member
states, only Romania receives more in CT than in NT, while the reverse holds for the
remaining new member states.14 In sum, CT is favorable to big countries except Spain
and Poland that gained significantly in Nice compared to the pre-enlargement rules (cf.
Baldwin et al. 2001 and Baldwin and Widgrén 2004b).
In Table 4, we take 2003 as the reference year, as this was the last complete year of
EU-15. The size of the EU budget was about 100 billion euros in 2003. Consequently, our
estimates for the receipts of the EU-15 countries prior to eastern enlargement are obtained
by multiplying this figure by the budget share estimates given in Table 3. We estimate
that the EU-budget will be 4.5% larger in EU-27, corresponding the percentage increase
in EU wide GDP due to the new countries. Therefore, a comparable ”as if” estimate
for the EU-27 budget is 104.5 billion euros. The estimates of the receipts of the EU-27
countries are computed by applying the corresponding budget share estimates.
According to the figures in Table 4, new member states’ aggregate share of the total
104.5 billion euros is 32.1 billion euros under the NT rules and 26.3 billion euros under
CT rules using 2003 prices. The new member states contribute 4.5 billion euros leaving
the aggregate budget loss of 27.6 billion euros under NT and 21.8 billion euros under CT
for EU-15 respectively.
There are not many earlier studies attempting to evaluate the post-enlargement budget
receipts on country-by-country basis. Baldwin et al. (1997) is, however, an exception.
It applies a version of the Political Power model where budget receipts per capita are
regressed on SSI values per capita. The study ends up with a total cost of 11.9 billion
1994 Ecus when eight CEE-countries join.15 The cost increases to 15.1 billion 1994 Ecus
when Bulgaria and Rumania enter as well. The cost estimates would have been 20.4 and
26.5 billion, respectively, in the 2003 budget.
13This is reminiscent to the paradox of new members. Note, however, that here we have two changes:
the enlargement and the voting rule reform. Germany’s gain is primarily due to the latter.
14Note, however, that in EU-25 also the smallest member states gain (see Kauppi and Widgrén 2005).
15The paper does not consider Malta and Cyprus. Their total impact is, however, relatively small.
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Table 5 shows our estimates for the incumbent countries’ budget losses under NT and
CT rules in 2003 euros. The figures diﬀer from those of Baldwin et al. (1997), since the
voting rules are diﬀerent.16 Note, however, that the full eastern enlargement scenario17
in Baldwin et al. (1997), is well in line with our estimate using the CT rules. This is
because the CT rules made the incumbent countries as an aggregate more powerful than
they would have been under the pre-Nice or temporary rules in the Accession Treaties.
Given that power politics dictate the determination of budget shares, this suggests that
the budget cost of the enlargement should be lower under the CT rules than under pre-
Nice rules.18 If we compare our estimate under the NT rules to Baldwin et al. (1997)
estimates they are practically the same.19
Let us next investigate the distribution of losses among EU-15 countries. The point
of comparison here is the pre-Nice distribution of power in the Council of EU-15. Table
5 demonstrates that the distribution of losses diﬀer substantially regarding the applied
rules. Under the NT rules, the biggest countries loose more in absolute terms than the
smallest countries whereas under the CT rules the reverse holds. In per capita terms, the
smallest member states loose, however, more than the big countries in both scenarios.
Under CT, the losses of the biggest countries are at the magnitude between 40 and 60
euros per head per year, whereas they are at the magnitude of hundreds of euros per
head for the smallest countries. The most striking observation in Table 5 is Germany’s
absolute gain under the CT rules. Under the CT rules Germany obtains 5.3 billion euros
more than under the pre-Nice rules before the enlargement. That is over 40 percent of
Germany’s net contribution to the EU budget.
16In Baldwin et al. (1997) an interpolation of pre-Nice numbers of votes were used (for details see
Widgrén 1994 or Baldwin 1994). They were based on estimated logarithmic function. In the Accession
Treaty interpolation Estonia and Slovakia are the only countries in EU-25 that get one vote less than the
mathematical formula suggests whereas the other countries are fitting perfectly.
17Cyprus and Malta are excluded in Baldwin et al. (1997). Their impact is, however, relatively small
(1.6-2.0 billion euros depending on the voting rule).
18In EU-25 the aggregate share of incumbents’ power would have been 70.7 percent under the temporary
rules. Under NT rules the corresponding share is 73.2 and under CT rules 76.8 percent. The temporary
rules are not defined for EU-27 as at the time of Bulgaria’s and Romania’s entry the Nice rules shall
apply.
19Results on Temporary Accession Treaty rules are not reported here in detail. They can be obtained
from the authors upon request. The results diﬀer surprisingly little from the NT rules.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has estimated the impacts of diﬀerent voting rules on the allocation of EU
budget expenditure before and after eastern enlargement. Our analysis was based on the
view that the budget allocation is completely determined by member states’ voting power
in the Council of Ministers. We provided predictions for the EU budget under two voting
rule schemes, one under the Nice Treaty and the other under the Constitutional Treaty.
The results indicate that eastern enlargement to the EU27 has large eﬀects on the
budget receipts of the incumbent member states. The incumbent member states are
predicted to loose 27.6 billion euros under the Nice Treaty and 21.8 billion euros under
the Constitutional Treaty when EU membership is expanded from 15 to 27 countries.
Thus, according to our estimates the cost of the enlargement would roughly be six billion
euros smaller under the Constitutional Treaty than under the Nice Treaty voting rules.
In both absolute and relative terms, small countries loose more under the Constitu-
tional Treaty than the biggest countries, whereas under the Nice Treaty only relative losses
decrease in country size. Germany is the biggest winner under the Constitutional Treaty.
The key explanation is that population counts more on power under the Constitutional
Treaty than under the Treaty of Nice.
The results provide interesting ingredients for the evaluation of the recently agreed
financial perspectives for 2007-2013 and for the membership negotiations with Turkey,
Croatia and possibly Macedonia and other Balkan nations in the near future. For example,
with its large population Turkey could have significant additional implications for future
budget allocation under the Constitutional Treaty. Detailed examination of this and other
related questions are, however, left for future research.
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Table 1: OLS Regression estimates of the eﬀect of voting power on EU budget shares in
1976-2001
(1) (2)
SSI 1.119 1.003
(16.87) (13.48)
Franco-German dummy 0.0287
(2.79)
Intercept -0.010 -0.005
(-1.53) (-0.80)
R2 0.87 0.90
Notes: t-values are given in parentheses. The sample consists of 46 observations
corresponding to the countries in EU-9, EU-10, EU-12 and EU-15.
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Table 2: Votes in the Council of Ministers (pre-enlargement and under the Nice Treaty)
and population sizes of EU27
Votes Pop. (milj.) Votes Pop. (milj.)
Member state Old NT Member state Old NT
Germany 10 29 82.5 Bulgaria 10 8.2
UK 10 29 61.7 Austria 4 10 8.1
France 10 29 59.7 Denmark 3 7 5.4
Italy 10 29 57.9 Slovakia 7 5.4
Spain 8 27 42.3 Finland 3 7 5.2
Poland 27 38.2 Ireland 3 7 4.0
Romania 14 22.5 Lithuania 7 3.4
Netherlands 5 13 16.3 Latvia 4 2.3
Greece 5 12 11.0 Slovenia 4 2.0
Portugal 5 12 10.5 Estonia 4 1.4
Belgium 5 12 10.4 Cyprus 4 0.7
Czech Rep. 12 10.2 Luxembourg 2 4 0.5
Hungary 12 10.1 Malta 3 0.4
Sweden 4 10 9.0 TOTAL 87 345 489.3
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Table 3: Budget share estimates for EU15, and for EU27 under the Nice Treaty rules and
the Constitutional Treaty rules
Country EU15 EU27-NT EU27-CT
Germany 11.68 8.74 16.29
United Kingdom 11.68 8.70 10.88
France 11.68 8.72 10.82
Italy 11.68 8.69 10.56
Spain 9.56 8.02 7.05
Netherlands 5.52 3.67 3.20
Greece 5.52 3.40 2.35
Belgium 5.52 3.40 2.30
Portugal 5.52 3.40 2.27
Sweden 4.50 2.81 2.08
Austria 4.50 2.81 1.97
Denmark 3.50 1.95 1.52
Finland 3.50 1.95 1.49
Ireland 3.50 1.95 1.27
Luxembourg 2.10 1.10 0.75
EU15 69.31 74.81
Poland 7.99 6.92
Romania 3.98 4.35
The Czech Republic 3.40 2.32
Hungary 3.40 2.29
Bulgaria 2.81 1.99
Slovak Republic 1.95 1.52
Lithuania 1.95 1.27
Latvia 1.10 1.07
Slovenia 1.10 1.00
Estonia 1.10 0.91
Cyprus 1.10 0.80
Malta 0.82 0.75
New Member States 29.31 26.80
Total 100.00 100.00
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Table 4: Budget receipt estimates
Million euros Percent of GDP
EU15 EU27 EU27 EU15 EU27 EU27
Country NT CT NT CT
Germany 11680 9130 17019 0.5 0.4 0.8
United Kingdom 11680 9091 11373 0.7 0.6 0.7
France 11680 9109 11311 0.7 0.6 0.7
Italy 11680 9085 11032 0.9 0.7 0.8
Spain 9560 8377 7367 1.2 1.1 0.9
Netherlands 5520 3839 3341 1.2 0.8 0.7
Greece 5520 3551 2455 3.6 2.3 1.6
Belgium 5520 3551 2405 2.0 1.3 0.9
Portugal 5520 3551 2372 4.0 2.6 1.7
Sweden 4500 2937 2175 1.7 1.1 0.8
Austria 4500 2937 2058 2.0 1.3 0.9
Denmark 3500 2040 1590 1.9 1.1 0.8
Finland 3500 2040 1560 2.4 1.4 1.1
Ireland 3500 2040 1331 2.5 1.5 1.0
Luxembourg 2100 1147 788 8.8 4.8 3.3
EU15 100000 72425 78178 1.1 0.8 0.8
Poland 8348 7228 4.4 3.8
Romania 4164 4548 8.2 9.0
The Czech Republic 3551 2422 4.4 3.0
Hungary 3551 2389 4.8 3.2
Bulgaria 2937 2076 16.6 11.7
Slovak Republic 2040 1590 7.0 5.5
Lithuania 2040 1331 12.4 8.1
Latvia 1148 1113 11.6 11.3
Slovenia 1148 1048 4.6 4.2
Estonia 1148 952 14.1 11.7
Cyprus 1147 835 9.8 7.1
Malta 853 788 20.2 18.7
New Member States 0 32075 26321 6.2 5.1
Total 100000 104500 104500 1.0 1.0
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Table 5: Incumbent member states’ losses in budget receipts after the eastern enlargement
Nice Treaty Constitution
Country Mill. EUR % Mill. EUR %
Germany 2540 21.8 −5349 −45.8
United Kingdom 2579 22.1 297 2.5
France 2561 21.9 359 3.1
Italy 2585 22.1 638 5.5
Spain 1173 12.3 2183 22.9
Netherlands 1681 30.5 2179 39.5
Greece 1969 35.7 3065 55.5
Belgium 1969 35.7 3115 56.4
Portugal 1969 35.7 3148 57.0
Sweden 1563 34.7 2325 51.7
Austria 1563 34.7 2442 54.3
Denmark 1460 41.7 1910 54.6
Finland 1460 41.7 1940 55.4
Ireland 1460 41.7 2169 62.0
Luxembourg 953 45.4 1312 62.5
Total 27485 27.5 21732 21.8
Notes: The entries in the table indicate the diﬀerences (in millions of euros
and in percentages) between the estimated budget receipts of the incumbent
coutries after and before the eastern enlargement.
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